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EXPERIMENTATION AND THE "NEW"
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Daniel P. Selmi*
I.

INTRODUCTION

After almost a quarter century of federally centered environmental
regulation, the existing regulatory system satisfies almost no one. Indeed, if the goals at stake were not so important, the criticism directed at
federal environmental law has become so regular that it seems almost
wearisome. But all is not lost. Important, if somewhat sporadic, efforts
are underway to implement new innovations in environmental law, and
there are indications of a rough consensus about the road that environmental regulation should take from here. Most significantly, almost everyone seems to agree that economic incentives must be tested to
determine their feasibility in the everyday world of regulation,' although
the faith in and enthusiasm for this form of regulation varies widely.
This Essay offers some thoughts about how that experimentation
with this "new" environmental law2 should occur in the area of air pollution. One important implication concerns the relationship between states
and the federal government in environmental law. The regime of environmental regulation, as it has existed since the early 1970s, is administered through institutional frameworks originating in the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977, 3 with subsequent iterative, relatively minor adjustments. Broadly speaking, this framework envisions that states generally
will establish pollution-control programs using traditional command and
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School. The Author would like to thank Paul Locke,
Ken Manaster, Jim McElfish, and Ken Rosenbaum for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft.
1. See, eg., William Funk, Free Market Environmentalism: Wonder Drugor Snake Oil?,
15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 511, 512 (1992) ("Today the task is not to decry traditional
regulation generally, but to identify which environmental problems can be best tackled by
market system approaches and to develop the particular market systems appropriate for those
problems."); Craig N. Oren, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: A Bridge to the Future?,
21 ENVTL. L. 1817, 1838 (1991) ("There appears to be growing agreement that market mechanisms ought to be utilized as a means of giving sources the incentive to reduce harmful activities . .

").

2. The idea of using economic incentives as an environmental protection tool, of course,
is not new at all. What is new is the willingness to actually implement such measures. Richard D. Morgenstern, The Market-Based Approach at EPA, EPA J., May-June 1992, at 27.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988).
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control regulation, and that in doing so states will act within narrowly
prescribed boundaries established at the federal level. National uniformity among the states is a principal objective of the system.'
That framework, however, is likely to hinder the testing of alternative environmental control mechanisms. The system was not designed
with economic incentives in mind, and the weight of the federal mandates that it imposes on states operates as a disincentive for states to
undertake the expensive task of adopting a wholly different type of regulation. States may well avoid such a step entirely, reasoning that there is
little benefit in it for them, or they may make only half-hearted attempts
to implement economic incentives.
That course would be unfortunate. To ensure that these new methods are fairly tested and their effectiveness measured, we must consider
carefully the conditions under which such tests should be conducted.
This testing should be done in an affirmative, coordinated manner, and
much of it should occur at the state rather than federal level. Furthermore, if economic incentives are to be fairly tried, it is essential that
states be given some reason to use them in a variety of situations.
Thus, the perspective of this Essay is from the "bottom" up-what
role should states, the implementers of most environmental policy, play
in formulating the new regulatory landscape? It is also practical, focusing on the means by which alternative regulatory systems can be nurtured most effectively from the theoretical stage to the point where they
are adaptable to the various circumstances under which states administer
environmental controls.
II. THE ERA OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVE SYSTEMS
A.

The Benefits of Change

The debate over economic incentives versus command-and-control
regulation may have raged throughout the 1980s, but actual change is
now occurring. The first shoe dropped with the acid rain trading provisions of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,1 which are now being
implemented. A second, more recent milestone was the adoption in November 1993 of a marketable permit system for emissions of nitrogen
oxides and sulfur oxides in southern California.' At the same time the
4. Id § 7402(a).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (Supp. III 1991).
6. SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT Rules 2000-2015 (Oct. 1993)
(on file with Author). The Author acted as a consultant to the District on parts of the adopted
program.
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the states are engaged in a
variety of experiments with other alternative systems ranging from pollution prevention to information-based regulation.7
The southern California marketable permit program is particularly
significant, coming less than five years after the South Coast Air Quality
Management District (District) completed comprehensive revisions to its
state implementation plan. That plan relied principally on an extensive
network of traditional command and control rules that would have regulated increasingly smaller sources of pollution, as well as on fundamental
changes to local land use and transportation patterns. The District's
choice to forego this route, and instead utilize an untested pollution control system for a large segment of the emissions that it regulates, speaks
volumes about the difficulties of implementing effective command and
control rules in heavily polluted areas with multiple emission sources.
Laws of bureaucratic behavior lead to the conclusion that the District
would not make such a choice unless the obstacles to implementing its
previously chosen course were quite significant.' In fact, as the District
proceeded to carry out the plan it had adopted in 1988, the political opposition to the plan's implementation had grown to immense proportions, particularly as the economic recession deepened. 9
Both businesses and environmental groups have important reasons,
albeit quite different ones, for supporting the development of systems like
marketable permits. Businesses, of course, focus on the increased operational flexibility and potential cost savings that such systems offer-savings that the economic literature repeatedly emphasizes.1 0 But such
systems also offer the promise of enhanced efficiency in implementation,
and thus the increased likelihood of environmental improvement-a feature that should attract environmentalist support.
7. See DANIEL P. SELMI & KENNETH A. MANASTER, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
ch. 19, §§ 19.01-.05 (Supp. 1993) (discussing recent state initiatives in these areas); Morgenstern, supra note 2 (discussing economic incentive approaches being implemented by EPA).
8. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY
THEY Do IT 221 (1989) (noting resistance of bureaucratic institutions to innovation).
9. See, e.g., Peter H. King, The Siege Begins at Smog Palace,L.A. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1993,
at A3.
The AQMD, the war cries go, has become a drain on the economy, poisoning the
California business climate. If something is not done [it is alleged], firms will flee en
masse to less regulated environs. ...
The campaign started quietly about a year ago, but now appears to be reaching
full pitch. Dozens of proposals to diminish district powers are pending in

Sacramento.

Id.
10. See, e.g., J.H.

DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRICES

(1968).
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The currently prevalent command and control system emphasizes
the setting of federal standards and their systematic implementation by
states through the adoption and execution of plans and permits. Each of
these steps, however, affords those resisting regulatory controls with
means to block effective implementation at the state level: lobbying to
delay state implementation decisions, complaining to state legislators and
consequent legislative oversight of state implementation, weakening
changes to state law, initiating judicial challenges to state plans and rule
makings, applying for Variances, et cetera. In contrast, once permits are
issued and an emissions cap is put in place under a marketable permit
system, then avenues of resistance such as variances, changes in the standards, and amendments to state implementation plans are less likely to
be available. Rather, the emphasis shifts to enforcement of the permit's
terms and of the market mechanism itself. Because fewer means of
blocking implementation are available, environmental groupsII can focus
their resources on the avenues that remain and thus should be able to
12
increase the effectiveness of their efforts under the system.
B.

The Perils of Change

Nonetheless, the changes needed to implement economic incentive
systems and the uncertainties attending their implementation are quite
significant and cannot be taken lightly. The difficulties are both bureaucratic and structural. Administrative agencies, for example, must acquire a new type of expertise that they most likely do not currently
possess. Agencies administering command and control systems today
must put a premium on their ability to understand the technologies of
both pollution control equipment and the industry under regulation.
Under an incentive system the agency will still need this type of expertise
11. The debate over the District's marketable permit system reflected environmentalist
recognition of the merits of such programs. Many environmental groups stated their approval
of marketable permits in principle, focusing their opposition on particular features of the regulations implementing such a system. Only one group took the adamant position, formerly
common in debates over such economic incentive systems, that they should be opposed because no company should be given a "right to pollute." See JAMES P. JENAL, CITIZENS FOR A
BETTER ENV'T, STOPPING THE RECLAIM EXPRESS-WHY CBE OPPOSES THE MARKETING

OF POLLUTION "RIGHTS" IN THE Los ANGELES BASIN 5-6 (1993) ("CBE [Citizens for a

Better Environment] believes that no one has a marketable right to pump poison into the air
and impose the associated health burdens upon their neighbors.").
12. Of course in some instances environmental groups themselves may want to use these
types of "entry points" into the system but will not be able to do so. Under the Clean Air Act
and its subsequent amendments, however, it has been sources who have used these procedural
avenues to resist implementation, rather than environmentalists seeking to strengthen regulation through them. Lack of resources precludes environmental group involvement in all but
the most controversial or important of emission sources.
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to estimate the costs that industry will incur by complying with the emission caps set by a marketable permit system. However, the agency now
will have to develop sophisticated techniques for predicting the market
behavior of industry and the effect of pricing strategies on various
industries.
The practical difficulties in crafting a workable regulatory system
that relies on economic incentives are large, as the following three examples illustrate.13 First, monitoring of emissions becomes absolutely critical. The District's marketable permit program covers nitrogen oxide and
sulfur dioxide emitted from relatively large sources. These sources are
easily monitored, and many can afford the investment in sophisticated
"central station" monitoring equipment that will allow the District to
constantly measure emissions, thus ensuring the enforceability of permits
and the efficacy of trades.14 But other pollutants that might be placed in
a marketable permit system are emitted from a much larger universe of
sources. For example, reactive organic gases often occur when products
such as paints are used. Devising a system to effectively monitor these
emissions, at a reasonable cost to the many small business sources, is a
difficult undertaking.
A second problem area of marketable permits inheres in the idea of
a "mixed" regulatory system. An increasingly common, seemingly logical suggestion is that the regulatory system that ultimately emerges from
the experiments with economic incentives will be a mixed system with
13. The South Coast Air Quality Management District is a very large public agency with a
sophisticated staff. See Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure,Administrative Incentives, and the
New Clean Air Act, 21 ENVrL. L. 1647, 1716 n.191 (1991) ("Moreover, the SCAQMD is
probably the most technically sophisticated and best funded regional pollution control authority in the country. One EPA official told me that SCAQMD has more professional air quality
and air pollution control personnel in Southern California than EPA does in the nation.").
Yet it took the District staff almost three full years to put together a marketable permit program for nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide. During this time the District devoted almost all of
its regulatory resources to this effort; the adoption of command-and-control measures was, for
the most part, put on hold.
This effort was, of course, the first major attempt to install a marketable permit system in
a major air pollution area. Later uses of marketable permits will benefit from the District's
experience, and economies of regulatory scale will emerge. Nonetheless, the change in institutional expertise needed to support sophisticated economic incentive systems is considerable.
14. Because the sources that may trade under the acid rain trading provisions of the Clean
Air Act are also large, see 42 U.S.C. § 7651c (Supp. 1993), monitoring is relatively easy here as
well, see id. § 7651k (requiring sources to install continuous emissions monitoring systems
(CEMS), and requiring EPA Administrator to adopt regulations specifying requirements for
CEMS or for any alternative monitoring system that is demonstrated as providing same information with same precision).
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elements of both command-and-control as well as economic incentives. 15
After all, economic incentives will not be feasible in every instance, and a
substantial portion of the pollution universe will almost certainly continue to be regulated through some form of traditional command and
control.16 But what is meant by mixed? It may mean a system in which
individual sources are subject to both incentive-based regulation and
17
command-and-control in an individual regulatory structure.
Indeed, several forces coalesce to make this result a likely outcome.
Political opposition to a total switch to incentive systems for air pollution
control may well result in a compromise that adopts features of both the
existing command and control system and a new economic incentive system. Bureaucracies tend to resist discarding the existing system in toto
and to lean toward retention of existing procedures and standards. Finally, because of the untested nature of market systems and the possibility of significant adverse effects if the system fails, there is a strong appeal
to "backstopping" the new economic incentive system with commandand-control mechanisms, should the new system for some reason prove
faulty.
Such compromising, however, may well imperil the effectiveness of
the new incentive system. Perhaps the most fundamental precondition
for a properly functioning market to flourish is assurance that the regulatory system now and in the future will recognize the property rights that
are created within the market." If a system is adopted that has both
command and control as well as incentive features, market participants
may view the very choice of this mixed system as proof that regulators
are less than fully committed to the use of market principles. They will
factor that conclusion into their regulatory calculations. They may decide that sale of excess emission reductions is not a wise move, as the
company might need those reductions itself should the regulatory system
15. Michael C. Blumm, The FallaciesofFree Market Environmentalism, 15 HARV. J.L. &

PUB. PoL'Y 371, 381 (1992) (noting that "[n]on-regulatory mechanisms are increasingly married to regulatory techniques in modem environmental legislation").
16. See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., A Century of Air Pollution ControlLaw: What's Worked;

What's Failed; What Might Work, 21 ENVTL. L. 1549, 1633 (1991) (suggesting that emissions
trading as method for controlling all pollution as complex as that regulated by Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 "seems unwise").
17. The offset provisions of the Clean Air Act provide such an example. They contain
both incentives (sources may obtain the cheapest package of offsets available) and command
and control (sources must use the lowest achievable emission rate). 42 U.S.C.A. § 7502(a)(1),
(2) (West Supp. 1993).
18. Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of
EPA's Emissions Trading Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109, 144 (1989) (citing "uncertainties

associated with property rights" as one of two features affecting performance of emissions
trading markets).
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later revert back to a single command and control apparatus. Under
those circumstances, the market cannot flourish. 19
A third problem with marketable permit systems arises from the
fact that any market incentive system will remain subject to the regulatory politics now practiced under command and control. As such, the
new system will inevitably be subject to political intervention during the
implementation process, for throughout that process actors will continue
to pursue their own interests on a political level.2 0 Whether their interests are commercial or environmental in nature, if they perceive that the
market is placing them at a disadvantage, they will forcefully seek legislative, judicial, or executive intervention to change the features of the market that they find objectionable.
For example, if a regulated company concludes that the price of
trading units in a marketable permit system has risen too steeply and is
affecting the company's profitability or continued existence, it will not
treat that price as the inexorable outcome of a market that it cannot
manipulate. Rather, the company will lobby for legislative and regulatory relief, seeking either changes in the market directly or a "variance"
applicable only to a single firm in an industry. If granted, however, each
change will diminish the certainty required for market mechanisms to
operate effectively, because parties will take into account the fact that the
value of permits authorizing emissions may change due to political
whim.
Consistent with the existence of these types of uncertainties about
the implementation of economic incentives, the current empirical evidence is quite inconclusive about whether such systems actually can be
implemented in an effective manner for the wide variety of air pollution
sources now regulated under command and control. Some of the past
experiments have worked; others have not. And surprisingly, most of the
experiments have not been extensively analyzed to identify the reasons
19. Significantly, this type of thinking may explain the lack of trading under the Clear Air

Act's "offset" program. See John P. Dwyer, The Use of Market Incentives in ControllingAir
Pollution: California'sMarketable PermitsProgram, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 103, 109 (1993) (not-

ing that plant managers operating under so-called offset program tend to hoard credits, in part
because of fear that air pollution control district will demand new emission reductions in
future).
20. See John T. Scholz, CooperativeRegulatory Enforcement and the Politicsof Adminis-

trativeEffectiveness, 85 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 115, 115 (1991) ("In the last two decades, political
science has emphasized the role of interests in causing administrative ineffectiveness. Administrative choices are portrayed as the continuation of legislative politics by other means, with

opposition groups sabotaging effective administration at every turn ....

").
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the conditions under which
for their performance and thus to determine
21
effectively.
operate
can
systems
incentive
This is not to argue that such systems should not be tried. Instead,
it suggests the critical importance of the circumstances under which incentive systems such as marketable permits are tested. The principal
goals of this testing period should be to evolve a set of conditions under
which certain types of economic incentives are likely to work well, and to
identify the bureaucratic resources that are necessary to administer
them.22 From this body of accumulated information, judgments can be
made about the types of circumstances for which different approaches
are best suited.
In short, rather than engaging in a series of ad hoc efforts, we should
affirmatively embark on a course of managed innovation in environmental regulation by encouraging experiments and closely monitoring them.
Unless an orderly approach is used, it is likely that none of the controversy over the appropriate future course of environmental law will be
settled. Either insufficient experimentation will occur upon which to
base any judgments, or experiments will occur under circumstances that
are inadequate to determine whether such mechanisms can work on a
broad scale. In either case, the debate over whether economic incentives
are truly workable will simply shift to arguments over the reasons for the
tested system's lack of performance, with some suggesting that it proves
the failure of such systems, and others insisting that the system was never
properly tried.
III.

THE ROLE OF THE STATES

A.

PrincipledExperimentation

The question, then, is how to test the new environmental law. Be-

low I suggest four core guidelines that should be used to structure this
effort.
A threshold issue is what roles the federal and state governments
should respectively play in this effort. Important work on incentive systems is occurring at the federal level, and the federal government should
establish the framework within which experimentation can take place.
The actual testing of economic incentives, however, should be carried out
largely by the states. In the past decade the larger states have shown the
21. Hahn & Hester, supra note 18, at 113 (reviewing literature and noting that "only an
incomplete picture of the actual performance of the emissions trading policy exists").
22. Ideally, this effort should include a wider variety of mechanisms, ranging the gamut
from fees to taxes to marketable permits to pure information disclosure systems.
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capacity to innovate in the environmental law field by undertaking important experiments in risk management,2 3 pollution prevention,24 hazardous waste clean up,2" information-based disclosure,2 6 and marketable
permit systems. Moreover, federal environmental law has borrowed
heavily from state innovations, at least in recent years.2 7
Most importantly, a couple of practical reasons require that the
effort be state-led. First, states are best suited to provide the variety of
regulatory settings needed to determine whether economic incentives can
viably replace command and control. Furthermore, if economic incentives prove to be a success, states ultimately will be charged with implementing them (unless the current federal-state structure of
environmental law is totally discarded). Therefore, gaining experience at
the state level seems sensible. Finally, using states as the focus is prudent
in light of the health risks involved: There is a possibility that a marketbased system will not work properly and a significant pollution problem
will occur. Having states, or subsets of states, experiment with the program limits the public health risk to a smaller geographic area.2 8
The second principle concerns timing. It is critical to recognize that
effective testing and determination of the usefulness of alternative mechanisms such as marketable permits are not tasks that can be carried out
quickly. Policy experimentation with market mechanisms requires allowing markets to operate through short-term fluctuations in order to
analyze their long-term workability. Accordingly, there must be a commitment to longer-term experimentation with marketable permits.
This commitment to a deliberateness in approach contradicts environmental law's long-declared purpose to ameliorate health risks on an
expedited basis.29 It conflicts with the short attention span of environ23. See Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act, ch. 403, § 1, N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, ch. 1K19 to -32 (West 1991); Extremely Hazardous Substances Risk Management Act, ch. 417, § 1,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 7701-7718 (1991).
24. See Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction Act, ch. 265, § 3, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 211, §§ 1-23 (West Supp. 1993).
25. Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act, ch. 330, § 1, N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, ch.
1K-6 to -13 (West 1991).
26. Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 25249.5-.13 (West 1992).
27. See Sheldon Kamieniecki & Michael R. Ferrall, Intergovernmental Relations and
Clean-Air Policy in Southern California, PUBLIUS, Summer 1991, at 143, 153 ("[I]t is fair to
say that California's approach to controlling air pollution strongly shaped the contents of the
federal law rather than the other way around.").
28. States may be unwilling to run that risk absent incentives to do so. See infra notes 3032 and accompanying text.
29. See, for example, the Clean Water Act's initial, unrealistic goal of "zero discharge" by
1985. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988).
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mental politics in which legislators often respond to election cycles rather
than to a program's long-term institutional needs. And it contradicts the
volatility of environmental law over the past fifteen years, especially at
the federal level, which saw wide swings in administrative approaches
and commitment to environmental regulation.3" However, unless a
longer experimentation period is ensured, the experiments will raise more
questions than they answer.
The third guiding principle, closely related to the second, is the need
to provide stability in the experiments over the long term and to resist
interim "quick fixes." The experience with implementation of environmental law over the last twenty-five years has been that parties to the
regulatory system constantly attempt to adjust the system so as to promote their own views of what the system should be achieving. The same
is likely to occur with a marketable permit system. At the beginning of
the cycle, there should be relatively little controversy over the cost of
pollution control, with the possible exception of disputes over the initial
baseline allocation of emission rights. As allowable pollution levels decrease, however, permits to emit may well become quite expensive. Pressure to modify the system to lessen compliance costs will increase
correspondingly. At the same time, others viewing the marketable permit system from a different perspective may conclude that "real" pollution reductions are not occurring and propose modifications to ensure
that they take place.
Deciding when interim changes in the program are warranted will
be a very difficult task. Certainly a principal purpose of experimentation
is to accumulate first-hand experience with the system's operation that
can provide the basis for needed modifications. But the tendency in the
unfamiliar situation of marketable permits, encouraged by the political
pressure from interest groups, will be to move too quickly. Further, premature changes in the system may cause market participants to doubt its
long-term stability, or even its viability. This doubt may lead them to
behave in a manner inconsistent with actions that would be taken in a
true market.
Given the need for long-term stability in market mechanisms, the
burden of proof to justify early changes in the system ought to be high.
The experiments should be carried out over the long term and midcourse adjustments should be avoided unless absolutely necessary.
Fourth, the experimentation process must implement two important
components: monitoring and evaluating the market's distributional im30. See

JONATHAN LASH ET AL.,

A

SEASON OF SPOILS

(1984).
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pacts. These factors are key to forming any long-term consensus about
the efficacy of using economic incentives as a means of environmental
protection in a wide variety of circumstances.
The literature emphasizes the importance of enforcement in economic incentive systems.3 1 It is obvious that an environmental protection system featuring marketable permits will break down if the external
discipline that enforces market rules-and thus protects economic investments in pollution control-is lacking. Enforcement, in turn, depends on
careful monitoring of emission sources. The agency must be able to track
developments as permittees rapidly change their positions, and it must be
able to determine precisely how much pollution sources are emitting.
Here lies a dilemma: Monitoring must ensure that emissions do not
exceed those allowed by the permits in the source's possession, but must
not be so intrusive as to unduly interfere with the incentives and freedom
from regulatory intrusiveness that the market approach offers and that is
so attractive to industry. Achieving the proper balance will be difficult.
At the beginning any errors must be made on the side of vigorous monitoring, for unless the actual amount of emissions is known, the entire
system breaks down.
The distribution of environmental risks also must be affirmatively
evaluated, for allowing the market to allocate risks may well result in
localized accumulations of particular pollutants. Some recent literature
has argued that current environmental law has permitted the imposition
of an undue amount of risks on specific communities,3 2 and pollution
choices based upon economic incentives have the potential of exacerbating an already inequitable distribution of risks. This factor thus must be
closely watched, keeping in mind the goal of establishing general guidelines to determine when the accumulation of risk has become so unfair as
to warrant corrective intervention in the market.
B.

FosteringEffective Experimentation

Under what conditions would states be willing to carry out the type
of program outlined above? It might be suggested that they will do so
voluntarily, but there are two reasons why reliance on voluntary efforts
31. See, e.g., Marshall J.Breger et al., Providing Economic Incentives in Environmental
Regulation, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 463, 469 (1991) ("Monitoring and enforcement is a key element in both regulatory and economic incentive systems ....").
32. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice" The Distributional
Effects of EnvironmentalProtection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787, 806-25 (1993) (discussing how
low-income and ethnic minority groups suffer disproportionately from environmental pollution under present regulatory regime).
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without further attempts to encourage innovation is insufficient. First,
voluntary state efforts are not likely to encompass the variety of situations in which alternative systems should be tested. Because states will
voluntarily implement alternative environmental control efforts in response to political forces operating in specific jurisdictions, there will be a
randomness to state experimentation that is not consistent with the need
for testing economic incentive mechanisms systematically in a well-considered variety of circumstances.
Equally important, any states voluntarily trying such systems will
have to comply concurrently with existing federal command and control
mandates. Because the resources needed to simultaneously implement
both a command and control system and an alternative economic incentive program are extensive, the tendency will either be to take the easiest
course-use only of command and control-or to cut corners and preserve resources by adopting a system that grafts some economic incentives onto the existing command and control system. As discussed
above, however, creating a hybrid program by combining elements of
both systems can jeopardize the proper functioning of the incentive
system. 3
Accordingly, for experimentation with alternative systems properly
to take place, a more structured approach is required, with states receiving sufficient incentives so that the necessary level of participation by
states in innovative pollution control programs takes place. Encouraging
innovation at the state level is not easy; the literature studying the question does not agree on when innovation is likely to occur or on the conditions that might foster it.34 The obvious method of encouraging state
innovation is providing money, but increased funding of state efforts is
unlikely.
The most reasonable step is to encourage state use of economic incentive systems by freeing states from some of the existing requirements
of federal legislation when they adopt such a system. States could be
relieved of specific requirements in the Clean Air Act that are parts of
the existing command and control system if they agree to adopt an economic incentive system. For example, section 173 of the Clean Air Act
now contains a blizzard of regulatory requirements designed to place specific procedural and substantive constraints on the siting of new sources
33. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
34. Thad L. Beyle, The Governor as Innovator in the FederalSystem, PUBLIUS, Summer
1988, at 131, 143 ("No state is consistently innovative in every area, in the same direction, or
at all times.").
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in nonattainment areas." These include the basic offset requirement, a
mandate for "reasonable further progress" if the source is constructed,
use of "lowest achievable emission rate" technology, a demonstration by
the source that all sources owned or under its control are in compliance,
and a cost-benefit analysis of alternative sites, sizes, production processes,
and environmental control techniques for the proposed source. These
could be waived if a marketable permit system were in place, as the new
source could simply purchase the permits needed to operate legally.
Similarly, section 182 of the Act contains detailed requirements for
ozone plans that become more complex as the level of pollution in the
jurisdiction increases.3 6 These requirements include traffic controls,
clean fuels mandates, use of "reasonably available control technology"
on major sources, preparation of specific plans for VOC reductions
within a specified number of years, and the mandatory use of other specific technologies.3 7 Once again, many of these requirements could be
waived if a state adopts a marketable permit system designed to attain
the national ambient air quality standards within the same time as required by existing law. The EPA would approve the marketable permit
plan only after finding that it is enforceable and that, if implemented, it is
likely to attain the air quality standards.
Such a quid pro quo would allow states to concentrate on implementing the new system without the distraction of simultaneously complying with statutory requirements that are inconsistent with or not
directly relevant to it. By treating economic incentives separately from
command and control, such legislation would also help alleviate any tendency to adopt systems that unwisely combine economic incentives with
features of a command and control system; for such a combination could
send the wrong signal to those participating in the market.
Furthermore, these suggested changes would have to occur through
federal legislation, an action that in itself would have a significant side
benefit. To the extent that states enacting economic incentive mechanisms for controlling pollution must continue to comply with federal
statutes designed with command and control regulation in mind, they
run the risk of legal challenges to the new system. Parties resisting implementation of a marketable permit system, for example, might claim
that the system violates mandates in the Clean Air Act, such as new
35. 42 U.S.C. § 7503 (Supp. 1991).
36. Id. § 7511a.
37. Id.
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source review 38 or state implementation plan requirements. 39 Legislation
exempting alternative systems from certain otherwise applicable requirements would prevent such challenges.
It may be argued that authorizing states to use alternative regulatory systems in this manner would contradict perhaps the most fundamental tenet of environmental law as it has developed over the last
quarter century: the concept of a uniform federal "floor" of procedural
and substantive standards that binds all states and actors within those
states equally. States have generally been free to enact substantive environmental protection standards that are more stringent than those established at the federal level, but they must comply with the federal
substantive minimums. Further, a state must follow procedures established at the federal level or run the risk that the EPA will rescind its
delegation of control over a pollution control program to the state, or
perhaps file a federal enforcement action against a specific source.
The uniformity principle would not be unduly compromised because
a blanket waiver of federal standards is unnecessary. The principal substantive minimum standard-attainment of the national ambient air
quality standards-would remain intact. What would change is the
means by which those standards are attained. States would be given two
options to meet those standards: they could use the traditional command
and control system, or they could receive a waiver of some federal requirements if they adopt an economic incentive system and meet minimum standards that the EPA would establish by regulation for such
systems. While state uniformity would be compromised to a certain extent, that relaxation is a reasonable step to encourage state
experimentation.
Furthermore, slightly relaxing the rigid procedural uniformity that
has been a bulwark of environmental law might be less risky than it
seems. The premise of uniform federal regulation has always been that it
is needed to prevent states from competing and thus lowering environ' 40
mental standards to the level of the "lowest common denominator.
That premise may not be totally accurate, however, as there is some
evidence that states that have enacted programs exceeding federal mini38. Id. § 7503 (containing new source review requirements).
39. Id. § 7410 (containing state implementation plan requirements).
40. Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids ofSacrifice? Problems ofFederalismin MandatingState
Implementation of FederalEnvironmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1212 (1977) (arguing
that states may fear that resulting environmental gains will be offset by capital movement to
states with lower standards).
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mums also have strong economies,4 1 thus contradicting the idea that
states will necessarily use environmental protection as a means of competing over industry. Additionally, if states were always primarily concerned with attracting industry, they would never have voluntarily
adopted standards that exceed those of the federal government.42 It
seems more likely that a complex interaction of various factors would
determine the level of environmental control that states would adopt in
the absence of federal standards.
Moreover, as a practical matter, it is likely that federally mandated
state uniformity cannot continue in the same form in the future. If the
experiments with economic incentives are successful, the end result will
be a system in which command and control is applied to some situations,
while a variety of economic incentives or other alternatives are used in
others. In such a regulatory world, the procedural and substantive uniformity imposed upon states over the past twenty-five years would
change.
Finally, the process of establishing a framework for experimenting
at the state level would serve as a first step in re-examining the roles that
states play generally in the environmental regulatory system. The current system exhibits a number of features that certainly warrant another
look. For example, the Clean Air Act relies extensively upon state planning efforts that the federal government then certifies as compliant with
federal law-a system that has brought inordinate delays, much federalstate negotiations, less-than-realistic planning, and unwarranted assumptions about states' willingness to change their land use and transportation
systems to accommodate federal environmental goals.4 3 A step in the
direction of re-examining these requirements to see if other forms of federal oversight might be better is a worthy one.
41. See Stephen M. Meyer, Environmentalism and Economic Prosperity: Testing the Environmental Impact Hypothesis, Massachusetts Inst. of Technology (Oct. 5, 1992) (arguing
that strong state environmental policies do not necessarily hinder economic growth in states by
comparing index of state environmental performance and economic performance data).
42. For example, several northeastern states voluntarily sought to adopt the so-called California standards for emissions from automobiles that were more stringent than those used in
most of the United States. See Air Pollution: PanelPlans Recommendation by End of Year on
"California Cars"for NortheastStates, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 814 (Sept. 3, 1993).
43. On the subject of missed deadlines, see John H. Cushman, Jr., States and Government
Lag in Meeting Clean Air Law, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 16, 1993, at Al ("Today, as in every year
since the law was passed in 1990, many states failed to meet a deadline for producing plans
detailing how they would cut various forms of air pollution."). The agency stated that it expected fewer than half the states to meet the filing deadline. Id. at A7.
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CONCLUSION

The issue is how environmental law will enter the era of economic
incentives. Will it do so in a considered manner that takes into account
prior experience over the past quarter century and allows for structured
experimentation, or in an ad hoc manner ensuring only that the debate
over the efficacy of economic incentives continues in altered form? At
this point in the development of environmental law, experimentation
managed in a thoughtful manner will go a long way toward providing the
concrete answers that are needed.

